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CHAPTER V
Vice-ADMIRAL VERNON, West Indies Theater Commander, with mention of
Rear-Admiral Chaloner Ogle
The somewhat uncertain peace brought about in Europe in 1736, largely
through the efforts of Sir Robert Walpole, served to strengthen the
family compact between the Bourbon Courts of France and Spain and to
give time for the increase of the naval forces of these countries,
rather than to encourage, as Walpole had hoped, a continued tranquility.
The great sea-power of England had made possible the development of a
large English trade with Spanish America during the alliance of England
and Spain in the war against France. This growing commercial supremacy
of England was naturally unwelcome to Spain, and both by enforcing the
limitations placed upon trading, inserted in the Treaty of Utrecht, and
by annoying restrictions in the Spanish ports of America, Philip
endeavoured to reduce to almost a disappearing point English intercourse
with the Spanish colonies.
English trading vessels, always at that time partially armed, had
frequent encounters with Spanish vessels, and on neither side were the
agreed-upon stipulations duly respected. Walpole, more prudent than the
adventurous traders of England believed consistent with the honour of
his country, vainly tried to hold down the clamourers [131] for war in
Parliament. The final event which made the efforts of Walpole wholly
powerless for peace had its basis in the seizure off the Spanish Main,
by the ship" Isabel," of an English merchant ship loaded with contraband
stuffs, under Captain Jenkins. The commander of the "Isabel" appears to
have treated Captain Jenkins with unusual cruelty, and before releasing
him cut off one of his ears. In the spring of 1739, actually some years
after the event, there was displayed, amid great excitement, to the
members of the House of Commons, what may have been the mangled ear of
Robert Jenkins. The pressure was too great, Walpole had to give way, and
on the fifteenth of June, 1739, war was declared against Spain.1
[132]
Among the members of Parliament concerned in this demonstration and
violently opposed to the Ministry, as well as equally violently urging a
war of reprisal against Spain, was Captain Edward Vernon, a naval
officer, who urged that an immediate expedition be sent out against
Puerto Bello; he vigorously asserted, that it could not only be
captured, but pledged himself to take it with six ships [133]
only. In order more clearly to appreciate the bearing of the influence
of Vernon upon the events of this time, and more particularly upon the
expedition associated with his name, it is necessary to glance at the
record of his previous career. He appears to have had an amount of
influence in the House of Commons, and a popular favour outside, which
made it impossible for the minister to whom he was opposed to ignore
either the plans he pro' posed or his own offer to command the
expedition.
Edward Vernon was the second son of James Vernon, Secretary of State to
William III, and was born in Westminster the twelfth of November, 1684.
After a thorough study of the classics and the mathematical sciences, he
was allowed by his family to yield to a natural taste for the sea, and
entered the navy in 1701. He was with Admiral Hopson in the" Torbay" at
Vigo, the twelfth of October, 1702, and was second lieutenant on the"
Resolution" in the expedition against Hispaniola commanded by Captain
Walker. Afterwards he served with distinction with Admiral Sir George
Rook and with Sir Cloudesley Shovel. His first command as captain was of
the" Jersey," in which he was sent to Port Royal, Jamaica, and for three
years had a successful career on the West Indian station, capturing many
prizes. This was followed by many years of more important commands,
chiefly in the Baltic, interspersed with intervals of serving in the
House of Commons. It was the belief in England that if Puerto Bello
[134]
and Cartagena were taken, the Spanish power in the New World would be
irredeemably broken, and shortly after the declaration of war Vernon was
given a commission as Vice Admiral of the Blue, and placed in command of
a squadron of ships of war to be sent to the West Indies. His
instructions were" To destroy the Spanish settlements in the West Indies
and to distress their shipping " by any method whatever."
The squadron consisted of the "Burford" of seventy guns and five hundred
men, "Lenox" of seventy guns and four hundred and eighty men,
"Elizabeth" of seventy guns and four hundred and eighty men, "Kent" of
seventy guns and four hundred and eighty men, " Worcester" of sixty guns
and four hundred men, "Strafford" of sixty guns and four hundred men,
"Princess Louisa" of sixty guns and four hundred and twenty men,
"Norwich" of fifty guns and three hundred men, and " Pearl" of forty
guns and two hundred and forty men, in all nine ships carrying a total
of five hundred and fifty guns and thirty/seven hundred men.
Admiral Vernon sailed from Portsmouth the twenty' third of July, 1739,
and after some delays and digressions, occasioned chiefly by an
unsuccessful search for a squadron of the enemy near the Spanish coast,
arrived at Port Royal, Jamaica, the twelfth of October. With this as a
base the Admiral proposed to attack Puerto Bello and Cartagena, with
such of his squadron as he had remaining, [135]
several vessels having been detached for special service to harass the
Spanish merchantmen. The ships remaining were the "Burford," "Princess
Louisa," "Worcester," " Strafford," and "Norwich," and to these the
Admiral was able to add at Port Royal the "Hampton Court" of seventy
guns and four hundred and ninety five men, and " Sheerness" of twenty
guns and three hundred men, together with two hundred marines obtained
from Governor Trelawney.
On the fifth of November this squadron set sail, the "Sheerness" being
sent as a scout in the direction of Cartagena, while the rest headed for
Puerto Bello, off which port they lay to on the twentieth of that month.
On the twenty first he attacked the Iron Fort, so called, at the
harbour's entrance, with his full strength at close range, and with such
vigour that after a short but spirited resistance it surrendered. The
next morning while instructions were being given to govern the attack
upon the remaining fortresses of San Jerόnimo and Gloria Castle, a boat
with a flag of truce came to the Admiral's ship, the result of which was
a speedy capitulation on the following terms dictated by Admiral Vernon:
Articles of Capitulation granted by Edward Vernon, Esq., Vice Admiral
of the Blue and Commander in Chief, of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels
in the West Indies, and Commodore Brown; to Don Francisio Martinez de
Retey, Governor of Porto Bello, and Don Francisio [136]
de Albaroa, Commandant of the Guarda Costas at the same place, the 22nd
November, 1739, O.S. 2
As a result of this capitulation, the English fleet secured two Spanish
men-of-war of twenty guns each, one other vessel, forty brass cannons,
four brass mortars, eighteen smaller brass guns, a quantity of
ammunition, and about ten thousand dollars. The fortifications and some
eighty iron cannons were rendered useless before the departure of the
squadron, which shortly returned to Jamaica.
As had been predicted, Puerto Bello was taken with six ships, and when
the news, which had been despatched to London, reached there, the thanks
of both Houses of Parliament were voted to the Admiral.
The English reports of this victory state the number of men taken to
have been five officers and thirty/five [138]
men "out of three hundred, the rest being either killed "or wounded or
having made their escape" ; the Spanish accounts, however, declare that
Puerto Bello was defended by a total of thirty men and five cannons, and
Spanish historians point with amusement to the celebration of this
victory in London. The actual record of the number of cannons taken
away, however, and other circumstances, make it appear improbable that
the Spanish version is strictly correct, although it is equally probable
that the English account exaggerates the strength of the Spanish
garrison.
Whatever may have been the exact facts, the nation was intoxicated with
joy at the news of the victory. That the forts were only partially
manned was not known; the simple fact that Vernon's boast had been made
good and Puerto Bello taken with six ships was the glorious news and all
that was needed to make of him a popular hero. Hundreds of different
medals were struck to commemorate the event.* Vernon was the idol of the
hour.
On the twenty/fifth of February, 1740, Admiral Vernon, after refitting
his ships, sailed again from Jamaica for the Spanish Main, and from the
sixth to the ninth of March bombarded Cartagena, 3 doing some damage, but
also receiving enough injuries to his smaller craft to make it expedient
to sail to Puerto Bello to effect repairs. On the
[139]
twenty-second of March he attacked Chagres, lying off that place and
keeping up a moderate but continual bombardment, until on the twenty
fourth the garrison capitulated. The ships engaged in the bombardment
were the "Strafford," "Norwich," "Falmouth," and "Princess
"Louisa." After seizing a considerable quantity of goods of value from
the custom house stores, and taking on board all serviceable brass
cannons and other guns, the custom house was destroyed by fire, and on
the thirtieth the squadron sailed again for Jamaica.
That the strength of the Cartagena fortifications was fully realized is
clear from the fact that before he again assaulted that place, Admiral
Vernon remained almost constantly for months at Jamaica, re-enforcing
his squadron with ships and men. Late in the year his squadron was
joined by a number of store ships under convoy, and by transports with
troops. In January, 1741, he was further re-enforced by a squadron under
Rear Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle, consisting, with those already arrived,
of thirty ships of the line and some ninety other vessels, the ships
manned by fifteen thousand sailors. The land troops sent out from
England amounted to about twelve thousand, these latter being augmented
at Jamaica by about thirty-six hundred troops from the American
colonies. 4
[140]
The command of the land troops had been given to Major General Lord
Cathcart, who unfortunately died before reaching Jamaica, and the
command fell upon Brigadier General Thomas Wentworth, who appears to
have been particularly unsuited for the great responsibility thrust upon
him.
The causes which led to the later practical failure of this expedition
against Cartagena cannot be attributed to the lack of proper
preparations or equipments, nor to the haste employed; indeed, the
expedition appears to have been planned with the most careful regard to
all details. Vessels were engaged in scout service to determine as
clearly as possible the whereabouts of the French squadron under Admiral
the Marquis d'Antin, and careful observations had been made of the
fortifications about Cartagena, the prevalent weather conditions,
currents, etc., as well as the depths of water off the town and at the
Boca Chica forts.
The instructions given to the fleet on sailing from
Jamaica divided the fighting vessels into three divisions, 7 one under
Vice-Admiral Vernon (Commander in Chief),
one under Rear Admiral Sir
Chaloner Ogle, 8 and one under Commodore Lestock
. The fleet comprised some
thirty line-of-battle ships, twenty two frigates, and a large
miscellaneous squadron of transports, fire-ships,
[141]
bomb/ketches 5 and tenders, in all one hundred and twenty four sail.
6 Not unnaturally the rumors of these [142]
preparations for the attack on Cartagena reached that place weeks before
the news became a certainty, through
[143]
the definite reports of a French ship which appears to have been sent to
Cartagena by the French Admiral expressly to warn the inhabitants of the
impending attack.
During the last week in January, 1741, the three divisions sailed from
Port Royal, a few days apart, effecting a junction at sea on the
thirty-first, and making Cape Tiberon, on the western extremity of
Hispaniola (now the island of Haiti and San Domingo) on the seventh of
February. After several days of careful reconnoitring to make certain
whether or not the French fleet had sailed for Europe as reported, the
three divisions came to anchor in the bays near the cape. On the
twenty-fifth of February the fleet left for Cartagena under easy sail,
and came to anchor on the fourth of March a few leagues to windward
(that is, to the eastward) of the town of Cartagena, between that place
and Punta Canoas. During several days detailed preparations for the
attack were made, and various councils of war held, one of which settled
the important matters relative to the distribution of the expected
booty, and one confirming the Admiral's plan of attack. Great care seems
to have been taken to obtain as complete plans as possible of the forts
at Boca Chica, and careful soundings were made by some of the smaller
vessels all along the Tierra Bomba shore and at the entrance to the
harbour. A feint at landing on the [144]
shore side of the town was made by some of the smaller vessels,
apparently for the purpose, a hope to some extent realized, of engaging
the attention of the enemy from the real landing-point at Boca Chica.
On the morning of the ninth, Sir Chaloner Ogle, with his division, moved
forward to the attack, followed by Admiral Vernon with his division and
all the transports, leaving the division under Commander Lestock at
anchor. As the ships moving to leeward approached Boca Chica, the small
fort of Chamba (on Tierra Bomba, east of Boca Chica Castle) fired a few
shots, but was soon silenced and deserted. Three of the eighty-gun ships
were anchored close to the forts of San Jago and San Felipe, and
maintained a very hot fire, so that these forts were soon deserted; the
evening of that day grenadiers were landed and took possession of them
without meeting any resistance. Also during the evening, from the
bomb-ketches and from those of the ships which could comfortably
approach, a continual fire was kept up against Boca Chica Castle, which
was returned with some spirit, under cover of which firing troops and
artillery were landed during the night and next forenoon. The troops
were encamped under the protection of a woody growth near, but
apparently somewhat protected from, Boca Chica Castle. It was during and
immediately after the .landing of these troops that the serious
differences of opinion between General Wentworth and Admiral Vernon
began to arise, [145]
differences which afterwards were to prove to a large extent the cause
of the failure of the expedition, and which served at once to create a
most unfortunate feeling of antagonism between the sea and land forces.
The Admiral complained of the delays of the troops to press the attack
upon the castle, and on the eleventh he and Sir Chaloner Ogle joined in
a letter to General Wentworth urging immediate action. That delays
somewhat difficult to understand did take place is evident from the fact
that on the nineteenth, owing to complaints from General Wentworth,
several vessels undertook successfully, but with some difficulty, to
silence the Baradera Battery on the opposite side of the harbour
entrance, the fire from which reached the encampment of the troops, and
on the twenty-first of March, at a council of war of the naval
commanders, complaint as to the slow progress of the troops was formally
made. Finally, on the days from the twenty4Uurth to the twenty-sixth, by
the c0/0peration of the vessels and troops, both Boca Chica Castle and
the San Jose for, tress were taken, as was also one of the Spanish
ships. The San Jose fortress appears to have been almost deserted when
taken, and it is probable that this fort was not actively defended. That
the defence of Boca Chica Castle itself was gallant and spirited is
certain from the clear record of the extensive operations against it.
Before it was taken, however, the defenders had largely made their
escape, and had found time to partially block the channel [146]
up the bay by sinking the Spanish ships "Africa" and "San Carlos," and
to burn the ship" San Felipe" on the
shore. "
During the next few days the fleet was able to enter the bay; the
batteries at the small Passo Caballos entrance were easily destroyed and
a safe anchorage established. The forts at Boca Chica were adequately
garrisoned, the troops re-embarked, and preparations were made for the
real attack upon the city.
The Spanish Viceroy, Lieutenant-General Don Sebastian de Eslaba, was
resident at Cartagena, and the Governor of the city was Don Blas de
Leso. According to contemporary Spanish accounts, the forces at the
disposal of the Viceroy and Governor were eleven hundred veteran
soldiers, three hundred militia, six hundred Indians, and two companies
of negroes and free mulattoes. The naval forces in the harbour were six
ships with six hundred seamen and four hundred soldiers, making about
four" thousand men in all. These are probably accurate estimates of the
actual Spanish forces, and it is certain that the strength of the
defence of the place was "due to its well-built fortifications rather
than to the number of its defenders, whose numbers were undoubtedly much
fewer than the attacking forces. The Viceroy had ample notice of the
coming of the attacking expedition, and concentrated his small forces at
important points on the walls of the city itself and at San Lazaro, a
strong fortress [147]
built on a slight elevation, outside the walls, and guarding the
approach to the city from the land side. The strategic importance of
this fortress, and a general idea of the walls and other fortifications
of Cartagena, can best be obtained by a glance at the maps.
It was considered essential by the attacking forces to occupy first San
Lazaro, and indeed if this had been accomplished it is probable that the
remaining Spanish troops would have been insufficient to make any long
effective resistance to an entrance into the city. At a council of war
held on board the "Princess Caroline," on the thirtieth of March, in
Cartagena Harbour, in which the division commanders of both the sea and
land forces took part, it was resolved to land the troops at a
convenient point on the south side of the harbour, under protection of
the guns of the ships; the first duty of the troops to be to cut off all
land communications from the city. On the first few days of April troops
were landed at Isla de Gracias close to Mansanilla Castle, from which a
fairly good road reached into the town, passing under the walls of San
Lazaro. This landing was made without opposition, the guns from the
ships sweeping the country between Isla de Gracias and San Lazaro, and
the landing-place being beyond the range of the guns at Castillo Grande;
the relative positions of these places and others referred to in this
account are clearly indicated on the maps.
With the landing of the troops the dissensions between [148]
the commanders of the land and sea forces began anew; Admirals Vernon
and Ogle appear to have constantly condemned the procrastination of
General Wentworth and urged the necessity for immediate action if
serious ravages of sickness among the troops were to be avoided; General
Wentworth as constantly urged the necessity for more efficient
co-operation on the part of the fleet, asserting that the ships should
be brought into the inner harbour, where the town itself and (more
particularly) San Lazaro would be within effective range of fire. The
experiment of sending one of the captured ships into the inner harbour
was tried by Admiral Vernon, but the ship, although apparently finding
sufficient water, was finally of necessity abandoned, as unsupported it
could not stand the close fire from the city walls. This incident, which
furnished one of the prime causes of dispute among the respective
partisans of Admiral Vernon and General Wentworth, both then and later
in England, is easily understood by those familiar with the harbour of
Cartagena. The water in the inner harbour is now, and undoubtedly was
then, too shallow to hold ships of the size of Vernon's fighting
vessels, but through a very narrow and twisting channel it is quite
possible that one or two ships might with careful piloting enter the
inner harbour.
The friends of General Wentworth, in charging Admiral Vernon with
neglect in this instance, were clearly in the wrong, as were those also
who supported General [149]
Wentworth's claim that the fleet did not give its full sup" port to his
requests by preventing communication with the town from the shore to the
eastward. Admiral Vernon, when requested to do so by General Wentworth,
appears to have kept so far as possible the stretch of shore to the
eastward under the guns of some of his ships, but it could not have been
an easy matter with the sailing craft of that day to remain off a lee
shore at times of high wind and with a strong westerly current, ready
night and day to fire upon a small strip of sand overgrown with man'
groves.
In his criticism of the land operations under General Wentworth, Admiral
Vernon, somewhat overbearing by nature, seems to have been to some
extent unjust, and that he clearly underestimated the strength of San
Lazaro is evident from letters which he wrote at the time. It seems
doubtful whether in attacking San Lazaro, its weakest and most
approachable side was accurately determined in advance; but whether this
was so or not~ General Went' worth decided that without effecting a
breach an attack would be impracticable, and much time was consumed in
attempting to raise a battery for the purpose, as well as in
correspondence with Admiral Vernon, respecting the use of the vessels of
the fleet for effecting the breach. During this time the bulk of the
American colonial troops had been left on the ships, their usefulness
being doubted, more particularly because a large proportion of them were
[150]
believed to be Papists; by direction of General Went' worth these were
landed on the sixth of April, and after' wards are credited by the land
officers to have rendered gallant services.
On the ninth of April, pressed on the one side by the reproaches of
Admiral Vernon for the long delays, and threatened day by day with a
lessening power of attack due to the rapidly increasing sickness among
his troops, General Wentworth, with the consent of a council of war of
the land officers, attempted to carry San Lazaro by storm. The attack
was intended to be by night, but owing either to the trickery of native
guides, or to badly formed plans on the part of General Wentworth, the
attack was begun upon the almost precipitous southern side of the
fortress, with scaling ladders of insufficient length. This unfortunate
error served to warn the Spanish troops, and the real attack hardly
began before the broiling hot tropical sun shone relentlessly upon the
attacking forces. With a bravery deserving better guidance the troops
stood their ground, enduring for hours the terrible fire from above
their heads and the burning rays of the sun; but the ram, parts were not
carried, and finally the troops were forced to retire leaving, it is
said, half their number either dead or wounded at the foot of the walls
of the fortress. At a council of war of the naval commanders (Vernon,
Ogle, and Lestock) on the twelfth of April, it was recommended that in
view of the land forces having been unable to erect
[151]
a battery for effecting a breach in the walls of San Lazaro, and their
having failed to storm it otherwise, and also in view of the great
sickness prevailing, that "it will be for the King's service to desist
from the enterprise as impracticable." At a council of war of the land
officers on the thirteenth of April, the blame for the failure to carry
San Lazaro was attributed to the failure of the fleet adequately to
co-operate; but the failure of the under, taking was admitted and
definite plans for the embarkation of the troops were suggested. On the
fifteenth the stores were taken on board the ships, and on the day
following the troops, sadly reduced in numbers and many very ill, were
re-embarked. So great were the losses to the troops through disease and
battle that not over one third of the land troops appear to have
returned with the fleet to Jamaica.
For about a fortnight after the troops were re-re-embarked, the Admiral
kept the fighting vessels employed in destroying the forts and
batteries, the structural strength of some of which, particularly of
Castillo Grande, appears to have been so great as to have made the work
both difficult and tedious. Also during the interval before sailing an
arrangement was made, by means of courteous letters exchanged under
flags of truce between the Admiral and the Viceroy, for an exchange of
prisoners. On the twenty' fourth of April, at a general council 'Of war,
it was determined to sail for Jamaica as soon as possible, and by [152]
the eighth of May, 1741, the great fleet had left Cartagena, having, it
is true, rendered useless the defences of the harbour and destroyed six
heavy ships and some minor craft, but having failed to enter the city or
to obtain any substantial booty.
The earlier successes of Vernon made the news of his failure all the
more distressing to the English people, and the expedition and the
causes leading to its failure played a not unimportant part in English
politics for some time. Unhappily the first despatches to reach England
indicated a repetition of the success at Puerto Bello; premature
celebrations of victory took place and more medals were struck. For much
of the blame put upon Vernon for the ineffectiveness of the Cartagena
expedition Smollett is responsible. As a surgeon's mate he had
accompanied the fleet and undoubtedly his personal experiences were not
agreeable. Both as a historian and in " Roderick Random" Smollett shows
that his views were coloured by his own personal relation to the events.
Wentworth showed him' self incompetent both in preparation and in
performance and lacking in the qualities of decision and
resourcefulness. Vernon, on the other hand, was an apostle of
efficiency; his real place, however, was in command at sea, and to some
extent he must share the blame for the failure of the expedition to
realize its full purpose. Vernon realized the importance of sea-power,
and in one of his official letters says that he is "strongly convinced
that preserving [153]
a superiority at sea is the best security for His Majesty's Government,
as well as of the trade and prosperity of this Kingdom."
Vernon was a strong advocate of the more humane treatment of seamen, and
in spite of the fact that he caused their ration of spirits to be
diluted, retained their affection. His popular name of" Old Grog" came
from his habit of wearing grograin breeches; one of his reforms was to
have the rum which was served the fleet regularly before noon each day
diluted with a goodly proportion of water, a mixture which was
thencefurth called "grog".
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