Ogle Tales and Trails
This page dedicated to Sir Chaloner Ogle, Rear-Admiral of the Blue
-- Notes from the book “The
Tryal of Sir Chaloner Admiral Ogle, Kt., Rear Admiral of the Blue".
-- Notes from the book "Admirals of the Caribbean"
------ Showing the duties of Admiral Ogle during the war with Spain in the Caribbean, Theater Commander Admiral Vernon.
-- Extract from the book Ogle and Bothal, concerning Sir Chaloner Ogle.
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Notes from the
book “The TRYAL of Sir Chaloner Admiral Ogle, Kt., Rear Admiral of
The book was printed in 1743 in London for W. Webb, near St. Paul’s - There are but 18 pages numbered to 22, Pages 1-4 are missing, but the title page is present. Having purchased the book in December of 2009, if any of you have a desire to make the same purchase I must warn you that I found nothing near the value in the book, that was paid for the book.
Something of interest is that what looks like the letter “f” replaces the letter “s” but not in all cases - I can’t determine the rule. It does not fit the double “s” rule where the character “β” is sometimes substituted in older German writings.
The book only contains the narrative of the trial and some letters passed between Mr. Trelawney the Governor of Jamaica and other persons. No letters from Admiral Ogle himself, not even a deposition by Admiral Ogle.
Dated August 27, 1742 a Mr.Concanen sent a letter to Admiral Ogle "Acquainting him with the Governor's Orders to profecute him for the Affault". It seems that Mr. Concanen is the public prosecutor under the governors office.
Admiral Ogle was accused of assaulting the governor, by the governor, in the governors house. Seems that a man named Dicker, an apparent friend or associate of the governor was called a scoundrel and Rascal by Admiral Ogle, in reply governor Trelawney replied that Dicker was no more a scoundrel that was Sir Chaloner Ogle, at which time the Admiral "clapp'd his Hand to his sword in the moft menaceing Manner, repeating feveral Times, G-D me ! Scoundrel !".
There were questions asking if Ogle used one hand or both hands. Considering swords were hung loosely from a belt, at least when in dress uniform, it would require both hands to draw a sword.
In deposition by witnesses, however it was the governor who actually drew his sword and was restrained by an A V_. A V_ made it clear that from his observations it was the Governor, already known as somewhat of a hot head, who was out of control. This A V_ is mentioned a number of times in the documentation. It is possible that A V_, is meant to be Admiral Vernon who served under Admiral Ogle at that time in Jamaica, Except A V_ is also referred to as Mr. and not knowing the protocol of the time I have no idea if “Mr.” Was applied to military officers.
All that I read from the depositions favored Admiral Ogle, regardless, the Governor’s counsel found in the Governor’s favor and against the Admiral.
However, there is no mention of Admiral Ogle receiving punishment or fine. It could be because Admiral Ogle commanded the entire British war fleet in the Caribbean at that time. Had Ogle moved his fleet to another island a very large amount of income could have been lost to the merchants on Jamaica.
There is mention of a complaint from a “master of a Northern Vessel” of “pressing or impressment”, seems his best hands were “impressed” obviously leaving him with a short and less than competent crew. Being common at the time when manpower was needed, it was the practice of the British Navy to “press into service” sailors from any ship around.
After multiple readings, it becomes clear that this Dicker fellow was very vocal in opposing impressment. I suppose this was a sore point with Admiral Ogle, Commanding the entire British Fleet in the Caribbean (West Indies) at the time, his fleet probably had many sailors that were “pressed” into British service.
If you remember our history, this is one of the complaints the young United States had against the British that helped start the war of 1812. No further mention of the “pressing” matter is mentioned.
Another thing I puzzle over is the word Chimeras, see Greek mythology. No clarification of the word is described in the book. It is not at all clear but I now believe it refers to the “impressed” sailors, in that they would be a diverse group from countries around the world. As of this date the British fleet has landed everywhere except perhaps Japan.
Dated October 4,
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The great sea-power of England had made possible the development of a large English trade with Spanish America during the alliance of England and Spain in the war against France. This growing commercial supremacy of England was naturally unwelcome to Spain, and both by enforcing the limitations placed upon trading, inserted in the Treaty of Utrecht, and by annoying restrictions in the Spanish ports of America, Philip endeavoured to reduce to almost a disappearing point English intercourse with the Spanish colonies.
English trading vessels, always at that time partially armed, had frequent encounters with Spanish vessels, and on neither side were the agreed-upon stipulations duly respected. Walpole, more prudent than the adventurous traders of England believed consistent with the honour of his country, vainly tried to hold down the clamourers  for war in Parliament. The final event which made the efforts of Walpole wholly powerless for peace had its basis in the seizure off the Spanish Main, by the ship" Isabel," of an English merchant ship loaded with contraband stuffs, under Captain Jenkins. The commander of the "Isabel" appears to have treated Captain Jenkins with unusual cruelty, and before releasing him cut off one of his ears. In the spring of 1739, actually some years after the event, there was displayed, amid great excitement, to the members of the House of Commons, what may have been the mangled ear of Robert Jenkins. The pressure was too great, Walpole had to give way, and on the fifteenth of June, 1739, war was declared against Spain.1
 Among the members of Parliament concerned in this demonstration and violently opposed to the Ministry, as well as equally violently urging a war of reprisal against Spain, was Captain Edward Vernon, a naval officer, who urged that an immediate expedition be sent out against Puerto Bello; he vigorously asserted, that it could not only be captured, but pledged himself to take it with six ships  only. In order more clearly to appreciate the bearing of the influence of Vernon upon the events of this time, and more particularly upon the expedition associated with his name, it is necessary to glance at the record of his previous career. He appears to have had an amount of influence in the House of Commons, and a popular favour outside, which made it impossible for the minister to whom he was opposed to ignore either the plans he pro' posed or his own offer to command the expedition.
Edward Vernon was the second son of James Vernon, Secretary of State to William III, and was born in Westminster the twelfth of November, 1684. After a thorough study of the classics and the mathematical sciences, he was allowed by his family to yield to a natural taste for the sea, and entered the navy in 1701. He was with Admiral Hopson in the" Torbay" at Vigo, the twelfth of October, 1702, and was second lieutenant on the" Resolution" in the expedition against Hispaniola commanded by Captain Walker. Afterwards he served with distinction with Admiral Sir George Rook and with Sir Cloudesley Shovel. His first command as captain was of the" Jersey," in which he was sent to Port Royal, Jamaica, and for three years had a successful career on the West Indian station, capturing many prizes. This was followed by many years of more important commands, chiefly in the Baltic, interspersed with intervals of serving in the House of Commons. It was the belief in England that if Puerto Bello  and Cartagena were taken, the Spanish power in the New World would be irredeemably broken, and shortly after the declaration of war Vernon was given a commission as Vice Admiral of the Blue, and placed in command of a squadron of ships of war to be sent to the West Indies. His instructions were" To destroy the Spanish settlements in the West Indies and to distress their shipping " by any method whatever."
The squadron consisted of the "Burford" of seventy guns and five hundred men, "Lenox" of seventy guns and four hundred and eighty men, "Elizabeth" of seventy guns and four hundred and eighty men, "Kent" of seventy guns and four hundred and eighty men, " Worcester" of sixty guns and four hundred men, "Strafford" of sixty guns and four hundred men, "Princess Louisa" of sixty guns and four hundred and twenty men, "Norwich" of fifty guns and three hundred men, and " Pearl" of forty guns and two hundred and forty men, in all nine ships carrying a total of five hundred and fifty guns and thirty/seven hundred men.
Admiral Vernon sailed from Portsmouth the twenty' third of July, 1739, and after some delays and digressions, occasioned chiefly by an unsuccessful search for a squadron of the enemy near the Spanish coast, arrived at Port Royal, Jamaica, the twelfth of October. With this as a base the Admiral proposed to attack Puerto Bello and Cartagena, with such of his squadron as he had remaining,  several vessels having been detached for special service to harass the Spanish merchantmen. The ships remaining were the "Burford," "Princess Louisa," "Worcester," " Strafford," and "Norwich," and to these the Admiral was able to add at Port Royal the "Hampton Court" of seventy guns and four hundred and ninety five men, and " Sheerness" of twenty guns and three hundred men, together with two hundred marines obtained from Governor Trelawney.
On the fifth of November this squadron set sail, the "Sheerness" being sent as a scout in the direction of Cartagena, while the rest headed for Puerto Bello, off which port they lay to on the twentieth of that month. On the twenty first he attacked the Iron Fort, so called, at the harbour's entrance, with his full strength at close range, and with such vigour that after a short but spirited resistance it surrendered. The next morning while instructions were being given to govern the attack upon the remaining fortresses of San Jerόnimo and Gloria Castle, a boat with a flag of truce came to the Admiral's ship, the result of which was a speedy capitulation on the following terms dictated by Admiral Vernon:
Articles of Capitulation granted by Edward Vernon, Esq., Vice Admiral of the Blue and Commander in Chief, of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels in the West Indies, and Commodore Brown; to Don Francisio Martinez de Retey, Governor of Porto Bello, and Don Francisio  de Albaroa, Commandant of the Guarda Costas at the same place, the 22nd November, 1739, O.S. 2
As a result of this capitulation, the English fleet secured two Spanish men-of-war of twenty guns each, one other vessel, forty brass cannons, four brass mortars, eighteen smaller brass guns, a quantity of ammunition, and about ten thousand dollars. The fortifications and some eighty iron cannons were rendered useless before the departure of the squadron, which shortly returned to Jamaica. As had been predicted, Puerto Bello was taken with six ships, and when the news, which had been despatched to London, reached there, the thanks of both Houses of Parliament were voted to the Admiral. The English reports of this victory state the number of men taken to have been five officers and thirty/five  men "out of three hundred, the rest being either killed "or wounded or having made their escape" ; the Spanish accounts, however, declare that Puerto Bello was defended by a total of thirty men and five cannons, and Spanish historians point with amusement to the celebration of this victory in London. The actual record of the number of cannons taken away, however, and other circumstances, make it appear improbable that the Spanish version is strictly correct, although it is equally probable that the English account exaggerates the strength of the Spanish garrison.
Whatever may have been the exact facts, the nation was intoxicated with joy at the news of the victory. That the forts were only partially manned was not known; the simple fact that Vernon's boast had been made good and Puerto Bello taken with six ships was the glorious news and all that was needed to make of him a popular hero. Hundreds of different medals were struck to commemorate the event.* Vernon was the idol of the hour.
On the twenty/fifth of February, 1740, Admiral Vernon, after refitting his ships, sailed again from Jamaica for the Spanish Main, and from the sixth to the ninth of March bombarded Cartagena, 3 doing some damage, but also receiving enough injuries to his smaller craft to make it expedient to sail to Puerto Bello to effect repairs. On the  twenty-second of March he attacked Chagres, lying off that place and keeping up a moderate but continual bombardment, until on the twenty fourth the garrison capitulated. The ships engaged in the bombardment were the "Strafford," "Norwich," "Falmouth," and "Princess "Louisa." After seizing a considerable quantity of goods of value from the custom house stores, and taking on board all serviceable brass cannons and other guns, the custom house was destroyed by fire, and on the thirtieth the squadron sailed again for Jamaica. That the strength of the Cartagena fortifications was fully realized is clear from the fact that before he again assaulted that place, Admiral Vernon remained almost constantly for months at Jamaica, re-enforcing his squadron with ships and men. Late in the year his squadron was joined by a number of store ships under convoy, and by transports with troops. In January, 1741, he was further re-enforced by a squadron under Rear Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle, consisting, with those already arrived, of thirty ships of the line and some ninety other vessels, the ships manned by fifteen thousand sailors. The land troops sent out from England amounted to about twelve thousand, these latter being augmented at Jamaica by about thirty-six hundred troops from the American colonies. 4
 The command of the land troops had been given to Major General Lord Cathcart, who unfortunately died before reaching Jamaica, and the command fell upon Brigadier General Thomas Wentworth, who appears to have been particularly unsuited for the great responsibility thrust upon him.
The causes which led to the later practical failure of this expedition against Cartagena cannot be attributed to the lack of proper preparations or equipments, nor to the haste employed; indeed, the expedition appears to have been planned with the most careful regard to all details. Vessels were engaged in scout service to determine as clearly as possible the whereabouts of the French squadron under Admiral the Marquis d'Antin, and careful observations had been made of the fortifications about Cartagena, the prevalent weather conditions, currents, etc., as well as the depths of water off the town and at the Boca Chica forts.
The instructions given to the fleet on sailing from Jamaica divided the fighting vessels into three divisions, 7 one under Vice-Admiral Vernon (Commander in Chief), one under Rear Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle, 8 and one under Commodore Lestock . The fleet comprised some thirty line-of-battle ships, twenty two frigates, and a large miscellaneous squadron of transports, fire-ships,  bomb/ketches 5 and tenders, in all one hundred and twenty four sail. 6 Not unnaturally the rumors of these  preparations for the attack on Cartagena reached that place weeks before the news became a certainty, through  the definite reports of a French ship which appears to have been sent to Cartagena by the French Admiral expressly to warn the inhabitants of the impending attack.
During the last week in January, 1741, the three divisions sailed from Port Royal, a few days apart, effecting a junction at sea on the thirty-first, and making Cape Tiberon, on the western extremity of Hispaniola (now the island of Haiti and San Domingo) on the seventh of February. After several days of careful reconnoitring to make certain whether or not the French fleet had sailed for Europe as reported, the three divisions came to anchor in the bays near the cape. On the twenty-fifth of February the fleet left for Cartagena under easy sail, and came to anchor on the fourth of March a few leagues to windward (that is, to the eastward) of the town of Cartagena, between that place and Punta Canoas. During several days detailed preparations for the attack were made, and various councils of war held, one of which settled the important matters relative to the distribution of the expected booty, and one confirming the Admiral's plan of attack. Great care seems to have been taken to obtain as complete plans as possible of the forts at Boca Chica, and careful soundings were made by some of the smaller vessels all along the Tierra Bomba shore and at the entrance to the harbour. A feint at landing on the  shore side of the town was made by some of the smaller vessels, apparently for the purpose, a hope to some extent realized, of engaging the attention of the enemy from the real landing-point at Boca Chica.
On the morning of the ninth, Sir Chaloner Ogle, with his division, moved forward to the attack, followed by Admiral Vernon with his division and all the transports, leaving the division under Commander Lestock at anchor. As the ships moving to leeward approached Boca Chica, the small fort of Chamba (on Tierra Bomba, east of Boca Chica Castle) fired a few shots, but was soon silenced and deserted. Three of the eighty-gun ships were anchored close to the forts of San Jago and San Felipe, and maintained a very hot fire, so that these forts were soon deserted; the evening of that day grenadiers were landed and took possession of them without meeting any resistance. Also during the evening, from the bomb-ketches and from those of the ships which could comfortably approach, a continual fire was kept up against Boca Chica Castle, which was returned with some spirit, under cover of which firing troops and artillery were landed during the night and next forenoon. The troops were encamped under the protection of a woody growth near, but apparently somewhat protected from, Boca Chica Castle. It was during and immediately after the .landing of these troops that the serious differences of opinion between General Wentworth and Admiral Vernon began to arise,  differences which afterwards were to prove to a large extent the cause of the failure of the expedition, and which served at once to create a most unfortunate feeling of antagonism between the sea and land forces. The Admiral complained of the delays of the troops to press the attack upon the castle, and on the eleventh he and Sir Chaloner Ogle joined in a letter to General Wentworth urging immediate action. That delays somewhat difficult to understand did take place is evident from the fact that on the nineteenth, owing to complaints from General Wentworth, several vessels undertook successfully, but with some difficulty, to silence the Baradera Battery on the opposite side of the harbour entrance, the fire from which reached the encampment of the troops, and on the twenty-first of March, at a council of war of the naval commanders, complaint as to the slow progress of the troops was formally made. Finally, on the days from the twenty4Uurth to the twenty-sixth, by the c0/0peration of the vessels and troops, both Boca Chica Castle and the San Jose for, tress were taken, as was also one of the Spanish ships. The San Jose fortress appears to have been almost deserted when taken, and it is probable that this fort was not actively defended. That the defence of Boca Chica Castle itself was gallant and spirited is certain from the clear record of the extensive operations against it. Before it was taken, however, the defenders had largely made their escape, and had found time to partially block the channel  up the bay by sinking the Spanish ships "Africa" and "San Carlos," and to burn the ship" San Felipe" on the shore. "
During the next few days the fleet was able to enter the bay; the batteries at the small Passo Caballos entrance were easily destroyed and a safe anchorage established. The forts at Boca Chica were adequately garrisoned, the troops re-embarked, and preparations were made for the real attack upon the city.
The Spanish Viceroy, Lieutenant-General Don Sebastian de Eslaba, was resident at Cartagena, and the Governor of the city was Don Blas de Leso. According to contemporary Spanish accounts, the forces at the disposal of the Viceroy and Governor were eleven hundred veteran soldiers, three hundred militia, six hundred Indians, and two companies of negroes and free mulattoes. The naval forces in the harbour were six ships with six hundred seamen and four hundred soldiers, making about four" thousand men in all. These are probably accurate estimates of the actual Spanish forces, and it is certain that the strength of the defence of the place was "due to its well-built fortifications rather than to the number of its defenders, whose numbers were undoubtedly much fewer than the attacking forces. The Viceroy had ample notice of the coming of the attacking expedition, and concentrated his small forces at important points on the walls of the city itself and at San Lazaro, a strong fortress  built on a slight elevation, outside the walls, and guarding the approach to the city from the land side. The strategic importance of this fortress, and a general idea of the walls and other fortifications of Cartagena, can best be obtained by a glance at the maps.
It was considered essential by the attacking forces to occupy first San Lazaro, and indeed if this had been accomplished it is probable that the remaining Spanish troops would have been insufficient to make any long effective resistance to an entrance into the city. At a council of war held on board the "Princess Caroline," on the thirtieth of March, in Cartagena Harbour, in which the division commanders of both the sea and land forces took part, it was resolved to land the troops at a convenient point on the south side of the harbour, under protection of the guns of the ships; the first duty of the troops to be to cut off all land communications from the city. On the first few days of April troops were landed at Isla de Gracias close to Mansanilla Castle, from which a fairly good road reached into the town, passing under the walls of San Lazaro. This landing was made without opposition, the guns from the ships sweeping the country between Isla de Gracias and San Lazaro, and the landing-place being beyond the range of the guns at Castillo Grande; the relative positions of these places and others referred to in this account are clearly indicated on the maps.
With the landing of the troops the dissensions between  the commanders of the land and sea forces began anew; Admirals Vernon and Ogle appear to have constantly condemned the procrastination of General Wentworth and urged the necessity for immediate action if serious ravages of sickness among the troops were to be avoided; General Wentworth as constantly urged the necessity for more efficient co-operation on the part of the fleet, asserting that the ships should be brought into the inner harbour, where the town itself and (more particularly) San Lazaro would be within effective range of fire. The experiment of sending one of the captured ships into the inner harbour was tried by Admiral Vernon, but the ship, although apparently finding sufficient water, was finally of necessity abandoned, as unsupported it could not stand the close fire from the city walls. This incident, which furnished one of the prime causes of dispute among the respective partisans of Admiral Vernon and General Wentworth, both then and later in England, is easily understood by those familiar with the harbour of Cartagena. The water in the inner harbour is now, and undoubtedly was then, too shallow to hold ships of the size of Vernon's fighting vessels, but through a very narrow and twisting channel it is quite possible that one or two ships might with careful piloting enter the inner harbour.
The friends of General Wentworth, in charging Admiral Vernon with neglect in this instance, were clearly in the wrong, as were those also who supported General  Wentworth's claim that the fleet did not give its full sup" port to his requests by preventing communication with the town from the shore to the eastward. Admiral Vernon, when requested to do so by General Wentworth, appears to have kept so far as possible the stretch of shore to the eastward under the guns of some of his ships, but it could not have been an easy matter with the sailing craft of that day to remain off a lee shore at times of high wind and with a strong westerly current, ready night and day to fire upon a small strip of sand overgrown with man' groves.
1. DECLARATION OF WAR IN 1739|
Trusty and well Beloved - We greet you Well-
Whereas several unjust seizures have been made and depredations carried on in the West Indies by Spanish Guarda Costas and Ships acting under the Commission of the King of Spain or his Governors contrary to the Treatys subsisting between us and the Crown of Spain and to the Law of Nations to the Great prejudice of the lawfull Trade & Commerce of our subjects; and many crueltys and barbaritys have been exercised on the Persons of such our subjects whose vessels have been so seized by the said Spanish Guarda Costas; And whereas frequent complaint has been made to the Court of Spain of these unjust practices and no satisfaction or Redress been procured; and whereas a Convention for makeing reparation to our subjects for the losses sustained by them on account of the unjust seizure & Captures above-mentioned was concluded between Us and the King of Spain on the 14th day of January last, N.S., by which convention it was stipulated that a certain sum of money should be paid at London within a Term specified in the sd. Convention as a balance due on the part of Spain to the Crown and subjects of Great Britain which Term did expire on the 25th day of May last and the paymt of the said sum agreed by the sd Convention has not been made according to the Stipulation for that purpose, by which means the Convention above-mentioned has been manifestly violated & Broke by the King of Spain and our Subjects remain without any Satisfaction or reparation for the many Great & Grievous losses sustained by them: We have tho't fit for ye vindicating the Honour of Our Crown & for procuring Reparation and Satisfaction for our Injured subjects to order Reprisals to be made upon the Crown & subjects of Spain. And We do therefore by virtue of these presents authorize & impower you to issue forth and grant Commissions of Marque & Reprisals to any of our loveing subjects or others who shall apply to you for the same and whom you shall deem fitly qualified in that behalf, For Armeing and fiting out Private Ships of War for the apprehending, seizing and taking the Ships, vessels & goods belonging to the King of Spain, his vassals & subjects or any inhabiting within his Countrys Territories & Dominions in the West Indies.
Provided always that before any such Commission or Commissions be Issued forth, security be given upon such Commission as hath been used in such cases. And you shall insert in every Commission to be so granted by you all such clauses and give such Directions & Instructions to the Person or Persons to whom you shall grant such Commissions as have been usual in cases of the like nature. And for so doing this shall be your warrant. And so we bid you farewell.
Given at our Court at Kensington the fifteenth day of June 1739, in the thirteenth year of our Reign.
By his Majesty's Command
Superscribed "To our Trusty & Well Beloved Jonathan [Belcher] Esq., our Capt. General & Govt in chief of our Provinces of the Massa. Bay and New Hampshire in America & in his Absence to our Commander in Chief or to the President of Council of our said Province for the time being."
[Part of the Declaration of war is located below the text of page 132 in the original book - I choose to keep the declaration together]
2. " 1st Article. That the garrison be allowed to march out, as desired,
upon condition the King of Great Britain's troops be put into possession
of Gloria Castle, before four of the clock this evening, and the
garrison to march out by ten of the clock tomorrow morning. That the
inhabitants may either remove or remain, under the promise of security
for themselves and their effects. |
2nd. That the Spanish soldiers may have a guard, if they think it necessary.
3rd. They may carry off two cannons mounted with ten charges of powder for each, and their match lighted.
4th. The gates of the Gloria Castle must absolutely be in possession of the King our master's troops by four of the clock, and the Spanish garrison shall remain in all safety for their persons or effects till the appointed time of their marching out, and to carry with them provisions and ammunition necessary for their safety.
5th. That the ships with their apparel and arms, be absolutely delivered up to the use of his Brittanic Majesty; but that all the officers, both soldiers and crew, shall have three days allowed them to retire with all their personal effects; only one officer being admitted on board such ship and vessel, to take possession for the King our master, and see this article strictly complied with.
 6th. That provided the Articles above mentioned are strictly complied with, and that possession be given of Castle St. Jeronimo in the same manner as is stipulated for the Castle Gloria, then the Clergy, the Churches and Town shall be protected and preserved in all their immunities and properties, and that all prisoners already taken shall be set at liberty before our leaving the port.
Given under our hands on board his Majesty's ship BURFORD in Porto Bello harbour, the 22nd day of November, 1739, O.S.
E. Vernon Chas. Brown"
3. Admiral Vernon Medals, 1739-1742., by Dr. Malcolm Storer, Proc. Mass. Rist. Soc. April, 1919.
4. These American troops were made up as follows: from Massachusetts, five companies; Rhode Island, two companies; Connecticut, two companies; New York, five companies; New Jersey, three companies; Pennsylvania, eight companies; Maryland, three companies; Virginia, four companies; North Carolina, four companies. Among other American officers was Colonel Laurence Washington, and it was on account of his association with Admiral Vernon that Mount Vernon subsequently received its name.
5. Small light draught vessels carrying one or more guns or mortars.
6. Sailing and fighting instructions given to the fleet on their sailing from Jamaica, by Edward Vernon, Esq., Vice-Admiral of the blue, and commander-in-chief of all his majesty's ships and vessels in the west Indies.
Line of Battle|
The Princess Amelia to lead with the Starboard, and the Suffolk with the Larboard Tacks on Board. But if I shall find it necessary from the different Motions of the Enemy, to change our Order of Battle, to have those who are now appointed to lead on the Starboard Tack, to continue to lead the fleet on the Larboard Tack on our going about, or those now to lead on the Larboard Tack, on the contrary to do the same, as the Exigency of the Service may require; I will, with my Signal for Tacking, hoist a Dutch Jack on the Flag Staff, under the Union Flag, the usual Signal for Tacking when they are to continue to lead the Fleets on their respective Tacks, accordingly.
Rear Admiral of the Blue, Sir Chaloner Ogle
Vice-Admiral of the Blue, Vernon
Commodore Lestock’s Division
be used during the Battle]